Thursday, April 29, 2010

Goldman’s public purpose and problems with the Abacus deal

This is a guest post on the blog "Naked Capitalism." If you've been following the SEC v. Goldman Sachs, then this post will help explain some of the issues behind the Commission's case.


Goldman’s public purpose and problems with the Abacus deal: "

This is a post I wrote earlier today at Credit Writedowns.


As I said yesterday, investment banks are institutions which do fulfil a useful role in society. I would define their role as companies where large institutions and governments receive financial advice and raise capital. Goldman Sachs is an investment bank. As such, Goldman must offer financial advisory services, capital markets origination, and secondary market support to maintain an orderly market in the markets in which it originates deals. That is what a full-service investment bank does and has always done.


In my view, the advisory business and the sales and trading functions are black and white issues.


Advisory Business


When Goldman gives financial advice to a client and executes a transaction or deal on the back of this advice, it must do so only in the best interests of the client. There are no ifs ands or buts here. The client comes first. I went into the moral and ethical obligations in my post "Inside the mind of an investment banker: Greece, Goldman and derivatives," so I will let you read that post to get a full picture there. I will just reiterate that this is a black and white issue. You simply cannot execute transactions or do deals that you know are not in your client’s interests. Full stop.


Sales & Trading


On the sales and trading side, Goldman Sachs is a market maker. That means their traditional role is to buy and sell securities principally to facilitate liquidity in the market. They are not a principal actor in this regard. As such, caveat emptor applies to their counterparties. Goldman is under no obligation to reveal its positions to counterparties in the market it makes. In fact, doing so compromises a firm’s ability to make a market. If you want to do a trade, Goldman’s only obligation is to show you a price because that’s what broker/dealers do. Lloyd Blankfein said as much in his Senate testimony. I see this as a black and white issue. They have no obligation to reveal their positions. Full stop.


Capital Markets


Then there is origination, an area where I have worked. Origination is what many firms call their ‘Capital Markets’ group. Here is where the problems begin because the origination groups are at once advisors and market-makers in their function. Your role as Capital Markets professional is to originate equity, debt, or structured product (derivative) deals for institutional clients, sell those deals to ‘buy-side’ clients, and to make a market in those instruments in the after market.


So, the capital markets guys must do deals that are in the best interests of the institutions, originating those deals. But, do they have an obligation to inform ‘buy-side’ clients of the pitfalls of those deals? Yes. 100%. This is where the problems lie in the Abacus AC1 deal that is the subject of alleged fraud. This was not a deal without a client. Paulson was the client. The synthetic CDO never would have been created had Paulson & Co. not asked for its creation. Goldman originated this Abacus deal at the behest of its institutional client, Paulson & Co. Therefore, Goldman’s obligation in the deal was to structure a deal which was in Paulson’s best interest.


The problem, therefore, is that in originating this transaction, Goldman was obligated to disclose to its initial buy-side clients what Paulson’s role in the deal was. Goldman was not selling a structured product without a client nor was it making a market in a security already originated. It was originating a deal purposely put together for a specific institution, Paulson & Co.. If Goldman did not fully disclose Paulson’s exact role – and all indications are it did not – then, at a minimum, it was not fulfilling its public purpose. The SEC has indicated this goes further – to fraud i.e. making ‘material’ misrepresentations to its buy-side clients and the company structuring the deal.


Proprietary Positions


Moving to a different track, let’s talk about ‘proprietary trading’ and the Volcker Rule for a second. What is novel in financial services is what is known in the business as "risking one’s own capital as a principal." Every major bank now is not just in the business of servicing clients in the ways I described above but also in making money as a principal actor.


This began during the 1980s when firms would risk their own capital in making bridge financing to corporate raiders like Carl Icahn during the Predator’s Ball days. One reason investment banks became so leveraged is that commercial banks had a natural advantage in this business due to their enormous balance sheet. So you saw firms like UBS, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan muscling their way into mergers and acquisition and origination via this channel.


At some point, the banks realized that deregulation meant they didn’t have to risk their capital just for other people. They didn’t have to do deals where the profit accrued only to their clients. They could become principals, taking what they deemed to be prudent risks for their own benefit. In essence, the banks all became hedge funds and private equity groups, often competing with their clients for business.


Now, the capital markets business already presents an ethical dilemma because of the opportunity for duplicity i.e. flogging off garbage as AAA to sell-side clients just to make a buck. This goes as far as getting bad assets off the bank’s balance sheet and sticking it with buy-side clients.


But, proprietary activity raises the potential conflicts to a new level by pitting a potential client against the bank for the very same business. The bank goes from market-maker or advisor to rival who cannot be trusted. This is why the Volcker Rule has been posited. The goal of the Volcker Rule is to fashion a way to separate these proprietary activities which are replete with conflicts of interest from the more public purpose role of banks. I don’t think the legislation based on the rule drafted makes a lot of sense given how difficult it is to define what a proprietary trade is. But the concept is grounded in the knowledge that these conflicts of interest pose a risk to the financial system.


My own view is that none of this will be resolved because banks make too much money in proprietary activities. They will lobby Congress until they get legislation more palatable to their interests. Only when the financial system does collapse will Congress be forced to turn away from the banking special interests. And at that point, with populist fervour against banks much greater than it is today, much more draconian remedies will be in store.


Of course, between now and then, there will still be a lot of money to be made by individual bankers.

"

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Will Greece's fall change the current world order?

Default scares are spreading through Europe and current predictions suggest there is little, if anything, that the IMF can do about it. Germany will offer some help, but politically it is limited to what it can offer. Think about this, what do you think Americans would say if they were asked at this point to loan $54 billion to Canada, $120 billion to Mexico, and $475 billion to Argentina? NO WAY!

At this point I'm not sure if Europe has the political capital to supply these three countries with the money necessary to save them. Maybe if the IMF maxed out its contribution the rest of Europe could cover the tab, but even that is not clear. Any organized bailout would probably require a combined effort from Europe, the IMF, the U.S. and at least some of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries.

Watch to see if Russia and China get into the fray. Both would love to exert greater influence in Europe (particularly as leverage against the U.S.). And what better way to exert influence then to own a portion of Europe.


From Washington's Blog: Greek 2 Year Yields 20 Percent, Italy Up 6 Basis Points, Portugal Up 7 Basis Points, Spain Up 27 Basis Points: "

It's not just Greece and Portugal.
As Simon Johnson reports:
This is not now about Greece (with 2 year yields reported around 20 percent today) or Portugal (up 7 basis points) or even Spain (2 year yields up 27 basis points; wake up please) or even Italy (up 6 basis points). This is no longer about an IMF package for Greece or even ring fencing other weaker eurozone economies.
This is about the fundamental structure of the eurozone, about the ability and willingness of the international community to restructure government debt in an orderly manner, about the need for currency depreciation within (or across) the eurozone. It is presumably also about shared fiscal authority within the eurozone – i.e., who will support whom and on what basis?
(In related news, Eurozone sovereign credit default swaps widened somewhat Tuesday, but tightened again after the German finance minister said that Germany will rush through a disbursement of funds to Greece.)

Standard & Poor's downgraded Spain's sovereign credit rating today from AA+ to AA, after recently slashing Greece's rating to junk and lowering Portugal's rating two notches from A+ to A-.


David Rosenberg notes:

Portugal’s stock market has traded down to a 12-month low and it’s so bad in Greece that the government has banned short selling for two months. (Hey, it worked in the once-capitalistic U.S.A. didn’t it?) We see in the NYT that Barclay’s analysts believe that Greece needs €90 billion to see them through, €40 billion for Portugal and €350 billion for Spain!That is €480 billion of refinancing help, which dwarfs the latest €45 billion EU-IMF joint aid announcement by a factor of TEN (according to Ken Rogoff, the IMF is maxed out after €200 billion)! Do euros grow on trees as fast as Bernanke-bucks? Would the ECB, modeled after the Bundesbank, ever resort to the printing press for a fiscal bailout? Where exactly is this money going to come from?

***

Yesterday was really as much, if not more, about Portugal than it was about Greece. Contagion risks are spreading as they were amidst the turmoil around Bear Stearns in early 2008 ...

[Spain's] combined fiscal and current deficits are the highest in the industrialized world, save for Iceland (and we know what shape it is in). The amount of debt it has to refinance in the coming year is as large as the entire Greek economy ...

***

If the other two major rating agencies follow S&P’s lead and cuts Greece to “junk”, then the ECB would be in a real bind for it cannot hold below-investment-grade bonds on its balance sheet. If the ECB does accept junk-rated Greek debt as collateral, then the sanctity of its balance sheet will be seriously undermined; though this ostensibly didn’t matter too much to the Fed in the name of saving the system.
It is tempting to assume that this is just a Eurozone problem.

But that might be a very erroneous assumption. See this, this and this.

"

S&P Downgrades Spain

First Greece and Portugal, and now Spain. The bad news keeps coming from Europe.


S&P Downgrades Spain: "

S&P cut Spain’s long term rating to AA today with a negative outlook. From Bloomberg:


S&P said in a statement today that the outlook on Spain is negative, reflecting the chance of a possible further downgrade if the “budgetary position underperforms to a greater extent than we currently anticipate.” Spain was last cut by S&P in January 2009.


The risk premium investors demand to hold Spanish bonds surged to the highest in more than a year today and the price of insuring Spanish bonds against default reached a record as doubts about Greece’s ability to pay its debt spilled over into Spanish and Portuguese markets…


“We now project that real GDP growth will average 0.7 percent annually in 2010-2016,” S&P said.


From the Wall Street Journal:


The ratings agency said that the Spain is likely to have an extended period of subdued economic growth, which weakens its budgetary position. The move sent equities in Spain the U.S. broadly lower, while the euro fell back to a one-year low against the dollar of $1.3131….


In addition, S&P took into account the possibility that Spanish public and private sector borrowing costs could remain elevated this year and next and further slow Spain’s recovery from the current recession.


S&P warned that “additional measures are likely to be needed to underpin the government’s fiscal consolidation strategy and planned program of structural reforms.”


Main factors dampening Spain’s medium-term growth prospects include private sector indebtedness, which S&P estimates is higher than that of many of Spain’s peers, as well as high unemployment, a fairly low export capacity, and an unwinding of the government’s fiscal stimulus as part of its current efforts to reduce general government deficit to 3% of GDP by 2013.

"

Ka-Boom: Yield on Greek two-year notes increases

The Greek economic bomb just exploded. Investors have completely abandoned any hope that Greece can make it on its own. Either the EU/IMF needs to take drastic action or Greece is going to default within two weeks.

How bad is it getting, Greece is viewed as worse than Pakistan, and some are saying it will need a bailout of up $100 billion (with a big "B"), see here. That's nearly double the initial estimate of $59 billion.

Yield on Greek two-year notes increases: "From Bloomberg: Stocks Drop as Sovereign-Debt Crisis Spreads; Greek Bonds Slump
[Y]ields on Greek two-year notes jumped to a record 26 percent ... The yield soared almost 600 basis points at one stage today. Ireland’s jumped 90 basis points to 4.64 percent, Portugal’s increased 93 basis points to 6.24 percent and Spain’s rose 20 basis points to 2.26 percent.
The IMF, ECB and German officials are meeting today. They have scheduled a press conference at 9 AM ET, to be followed by a press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at 10:45 AM ET."

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Raj Date on Resolution Authority, Conservative Arguments on Bailouts

There are two things I would like to point out about this post.

First, the article is much more detailed and more in depth than this post. In my opinion, this is the best article I've read about the proposed Dodd Bill and the effect it would have had on the 2008 crisis (P.S. it also hints at how close Goldman Sachs was to defaulting).

Second, I want to reieterate the irony in the Republican party's current position. The GOP is arguing that this bill would legitimize the "to big to fail" mentality of the big financial institutions. Does the GOP really take the American public for a bunch of fools. Deregulation and other GOP sponsored theories allowed much of the crisis causing behavior. And it was a GOP President and Treasury that provided the 2008 bailouts (although the Democratic Congress is also responsible). How quickly the GOP has forgotten its previous posturing on financial reform.

 
 

Sent to you by Bo Howell via Google Reader:

 
 

via New Deal 2.0 by Mike Konczal on 4/27/10

First up, Raj Date has a new paper out, titled: The Killer G's: Resolution Authority, Financial Stabilization, and Taxpayer Bailouts. It's definitely worth your time, as it explains how, if the Dodd Bill was in place in January 2008, our response to the Killer G's - Goldman Sachs, GMAC and GE Capital - would have gone differently. It's great on the topic, and pulls back to show the three types of bailouts we are worried about and what the bill does well and doesn't do well. Highly recommended if you want to learn more.

The Bailout We Just Had

Second, we need to talk about if there are bailouts in the Dodd Bill because conservatives are not going to let this go. But before we dive into that, here's what is incredibly important to remember: the major, serial bailouts of 2008 were not the result of some unelected, socialist technocrats hidden away in a government basement somewhere exploiting a loophole. They were the results of GOP-appointed Hank Paulson, GOP-appointed Sheila Bair and GOP-appointed Ben Bernanke, all with the support of a Bush White House-sponsored EESA going to Congress and asking that an emergency bill be passed to allow for TARP.

The Dodd Bill cannot stop this. If this all happens all over again, and it could, there's nothing in this bill to stop GOP Team Paulson et al Version 2.0 from going to Congress and demanding more money for the financial system. Congress can always pass new laws in an emergency, even if it means overturning old laws. The only way to stop this is through prudential regulation on the front end and a resolution mechanism that is earlier and reduces uncertainty on the backend, which the Republican oppose, or by dramatically shrinking the size of the largest and most risky firms, segmenting business lines to de-risk critical infrastructure from that which can fail with less damage, and/or bringing some of the more dangerous business lines like derivatives into market-based sunlight.

The Republicans oppose all that too. I'm not trying to be a jerk - I actually read the GOP House Bill on Financial Reform and there's nothing in it that does any of that. When the Senate GOP drops their version I imagine it will look the same - let's just redo the problem with more bankruptcy law.

I've never really heard of this working and it's predicated implicitly on the conservative's argument that Lehman's bankruptcy wasn't that big of a deal (an argument that usually gets demolished by the blogosphere whenever it peeks its head). But if Keith Hennessey or other Bush administration officials who oversaw the bailouts would like to argue that in retrospect their mistake was to not do an overnight bankruptcy law change and force AIG and Bear into a bankruptcy court, and that the economy would be better off for it right now had they done so, I really hope they make their case. I'd really want to read it.

Is There a Bailout in Resolution Authority?

With that in mind, section 210(b)(4)(B) of the Dodd Bill is being called out as the bailout provision conservatives are alluding to as allowing extra payments to certain creditors. See, for instance, Nicole Gelinas, and I think this provision is what is being alluded to in this unsourced accusation by Phillip Swagel. I'm going to kick it to Raj's paper:

4.1.3 Removing moral hazard

The mere existence of a special resolution regime for certain large firms, and not others, could in theory create its own difficulties. Orderly liquidation almost certainly preserves more franchise value than an uncontrolled de-leveraging followed by bankruptcy. Absent counter-measures, that would create a perverse preference by creditors to lend to the largest and most systemically risky firms, like Goldman, as opposed to smaller rivals.

In light of that risk, the Senate Bill crafts a strikingly punitive resolution regime. The Bill requires that the FDIC, as receiver, act "not for the purpose of preserving the covered financial company"; ensure that shareholders are paid only after all other claims are paid; require that unsecured creditors bear losses; and terminate "management responsible for the failed condition".

Crucially, the Bill also sets out a cap on the amount that a creditor can receive from the resolution of a systemically important firm. No creditor can receive more than it would have received in a regular-way chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation.(23) Creditors cannot be better off because of the existence of the resolution authority. Thus, the Bill effectively severs the potential feedback loop from the existence of a special resolution regime to moral hazard among creditors.

(23) - Id. at section 210(d)(2). Note that this maximum recovery also serves as a minimum recovery in those instances that the FDIC wishes to use its discretion to pay certain creditors more than similarly situated creditors, to minimize aggregate losses. In other words, the FDIC can preferentially pay a creditor, but only if similarly situated creditors are at least receiving what they would have received in a chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id. at section 210(b)(4)(B).

The repayment waterfall specifies that taxpayer money has to get returned before creditors get paid. If some creditors are paid more than similarly situated peers it can only occur if those peers get at least what they would have gotten in liquidation which occurs only if, by definition, the FDIC has already gotten its money back too. Not a bailout.

And as Raj points out in his conclusion, the real worry is twofold - that Federal Reserve expanded access to healthy firms in a crisis will disproportionately benefit larger and riskier firms, and that regulatory forbearance (that regulators will not want to pull the trigger to close a firm that is gigantic and has a huge political presence) hasn't really been solved by this bill. These are the real problems outstanding with the current sense of resolution authority, and would make for an excellent debate on the floor.

Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute.


 
 

Things you can do from here:

 
 

S&P Downgrades Greece and Portugal

Greece has just entered a free fall and taken Portugal with it, although they only have themselves to blame. This downgrade along with souring investor confidence in Greece and Portugal is certain to lead to the first major soveriegn defaults of the 2008 Recession. In other words, the global economy is in for another shake-up. Prepare your emergency shelters because who knows where this one is going.

 
 

Sent to you by Bo Howell via Google Reader:

 
 

via Calculated Risk by CalculatedRisk on 4/27/10

From MarketWatch: S&P cuts Greece ratings to junk status
Standard & Poor's said Tuesday it cut Greece's ratings to junk status. The ratings agency lowered the long-term sovereign credit rating on Greece to BB+ from BBB+. The outlook is negative.
From CNBC:
S&P downgraded its rating on Portugal's debt by two notches to A-minus.

 
 

Things you can do from here:

 
 

Bad news getting worse: "Yield on Greek Two-Year Bonds jumps to 13.5%"

As posted by Calculated Risk, the spread on Greece notes continues to rise despite the "reassurance" from the Greek government, the IMF, and the European Union. At this point it appears Greece is definitely going to default unless the European Union completely bails out the Aegean nation. I doubt this will happen.

 
 

Sent to you by Bo Howell via Google Reader:

 
 

via Calculated Risk by CalculatedRisk on 4/26/10

From the Financial Times: Greek bond markets plunge again
The yield on two-year Greek government bonds ... jumped 3 percentage points ... to close at 13.522 per cent.

This is the highest yield on short-dated government debt in the world ...
excerpt with permission
This is now higher than Venezuela at 11%.

The yields jumped for some of the other PIIGS too (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). For Portugal the two-year yield increased more than 3/4 of a point to 3.98%.

 
 

Things you can do from here: